Sin psychoanalyzed

 It is difficult to find true aphorisms of Thomas Aquinas.  He was no rhetorician, his precision and brilliance with language notwithstanding, and so he’s not often good for those ‘one-liners’ that everyone else seems to be able to write.  (E.g., Augustine: “If you believe what you like in the gospels, and reject what you don’t like, it is not the gospel you believe in, but yourself.”)  Nevertheless, I found a cool page that does its best to collect some quasi-aphorisms from Aquinas.  Here is one passage that I liked especially on the nature of weakness, choice, and sin:

  Since the act of sin or of virtue is according to choice, and choice is a desire for something previously deliberated about, and deliberation is a kind of inquiry, it is necessary that in every act of virtue or of sin there be a kind of syllogistic deduction. But a temperate and an intemperate person syllogize differently. The same holds for a continent and an incontinent person.

A temperate person is moved only by a rational judgement, using a syllogism of three statements, as:

 Fornication should never be committed.
This act is fornication.
Therefore it must not be done.

An intemperate person, however, totally follows concupiscence, and likewise uses a syllogism of three statements, as:

Everything pleasurable must be enjoyed.
This act is pleasurable.
Therefore it must be enjoyed.

But a continent and an incontinent person have two moving forces. One is reason, to avoid sin. The other is concupiscence, to commit it. But for the continent person the judgement of reason wins, whereas in the incontinent person the movement of concupiscence wins. Thus each of them uses a syllogism of four statements, but leading to contrary conclusions.

The continent person uses the following syllogism:

 No sin must be committed (a judgement of reason).
Everything pleasurable must be enjoyed (what concupiscence presents to his heart).
This is a sin (the victorious judgement of reason).
Therefore this should not be done.

The incontinent person, for whom the judgement of concupiscence prevails, argues this way:

 No sin must be committed (a judgement of reason).
Everything pleasurable must be enjoyed (what concupiscence presents to his heart).
This is pleasurable (the victorious judgement of concupiscence).
Therefore it must be enjoyed.

Thus the incontinent person has universal, but not particular, knowledge of the issue, since he does not follow the particular judgement of reason but that of concupiscence.

Catholic doctrine of Justification

One day I’d like to write a book that hashes out Justification for the curious Protestants and Catholics out there. I’ve tried to explore the doctrine as both schools of thought understand it, and let me tell you it is hell trying to sort it out amidst the straw men, emotionally charged op-ed pieces, and consistent misrepresentations on either side. What I really need is an account that doesn’t slant everything towards its conclusion, but a book that could be read by either Catholics or Protestants, after which both would say “yes, that was as strong a case as could be made for my view.” Really, it’s possible to do that – or, at least, I think it is.

Such a book is in the distant future, if it is going to exist at all. For now, though, I’ll post some short statements that I have collected over the past couple of months, made by the Catholic church, which I think are helpful for Protestants who are looking to see what the Catholics believe.

Notice that the Catholics sound a bit like Protestants when dealing with justification qua the initial forensic declaration of righteousness. There are still differences even when the Catholics restrict their terminology in this way, but more commonly I see Protestant critiques of the Catholic doctrine of “justification” because Catholics also use this word to mean “salvation” in the broad sense, i.e., the NT language that speaks of salvation both as a one-time event and as a process that is worked out throughout our lives. So much of the debate revolves around this linguistic difference. While differences would remain even with the terminology hurdle removed, it would make it a lot easier to sort out the ideas if, for example, Protestants weren’t so hell-bent on condemning Catholics for using “salvation” in the way that scripture seems to at times.

Together we confess: By grace alone, in faith in Christ’s saving work and not because of any merit on our part, we are accepted by God and receive the Holy Spirit, who renews our hearts while equipping and calling us to good works. (JD, p. 15)

All people are called by God to salvation in Christ. Through Christ alone are we justified, when we receive this salvation in faith. Faith is itself God’s gift through the Holy Spirit who works through word and sacrament in the community of believers (JD, p. 16)

We confess together that all persons depend completely on the saving grace of God for their salvation. The freedom they possess in relation to persons and the things of this world is no freedom in relation to salvation, for as sinners they stand under God’s judgment and are incapable of turning by themselves to God to seek deliverance, of meriting their justification before God, or of attaining salvation by their own abilities. Justification takes place solely by God’s grace. (JD, p. 19)

When Catholics say that persons “cooperate” in preparing for and accepting justification by consenting to God’s justifying action, they see such personal consent as itself an effect of grace, not as an action arising from innate human abilities. (JD, p. 20)

When Catholics emphasize the renewal of the interior person through the reception of grace imparted as a gift to the believer13, they wish to insist that God’s forgiving grace always brings with it a gift of new life, which in the Holy Spirit becomes effective in active love. They do not thereby deny that God’s gift of grace in justification remains independent of human cooperation. (JD, p. 24)

[Sinners] place their trust in God’s gracious promise by justifying faith, which includes hope in God and love for him. Such a faith is active in love and thus the Christian cannot and should not remain without works. But whatever in the justified precedes or follows the free gift of faith is neither the basis of justification nor merits it. (JD, p. 25)

The justification of sinners is forgiveness of sins and being made righteous by justifying grace, which makes us children of God. In justification the righteous receive from Christ faith, hope, and love and are thereby taken into communion with him.14 This new personal relation to God is grounded totally on God’s graciousness and remains constantly dependent on the salvific and creative working of this gracious God, who remains true to himself, so that one can rely upon him. Thus justifying grace never becomes a human possession to which one could appeal over against God. While Catholic teaching emphasizes the renewal of life by justifying grace, this renewal in faith, hope, and love is always dependent on God’s unfathomable grace and contributes nothing to justification about which one could boast before God. (JD, p. 27)

When Catholics emphasize that the righteous are bound to observe God’s commandments, they do not thereby deny that through Jesus Christ God has mercifully promised to his children the grace of eternal life … We confess together that the faithful can rely on the mercy and promises of God. (JD, p. 33-34)

No one may doubt God’s mercy and Christ’s merit. Every person, however, may be concerned about his salvation when he looks upon his own weaknesses and shortcomings. Recognizing his own failures, however, the believer may yet be certain that God intends his salvation. (JD, p. 36)

We confess together that good works – a Christian life lived in faith, hope and love – follow justification and are its fruits. (JD, 37)

When Catholics affirm the “meritorious” character of good works, they wish to say that, according to the biblical witness, a reward in heaven is promised to these works. Their intention is to emphasize the responsibility of persons for their actions, not to contest the character of those works as gifts, or far less to deny that justification always remains the unmerited gift of grace. (JD, p. 38)

This disposition, or preparation, is followed by Justification itself, which is not remission of sins merely, but also the sanctification and renewal of the inward man, through the voluntary reception of the grace, and of the gifts, whereby man of unjust becomes just, and of an enemy a friend, that so he may be an heir according to hope of life everlasting. (Council of Trent, 6th Session, ch. Vii)

And whereas the Apostle saith, that man is justified by faith and freely, those words are to be understood in that sense which the perpetual consent of the Catholic Church hath held and expressed; to wit, that we are therefore said to be justified by faith, because faith is the beginning of human salvation, the foundation, and the root of all Justification; without which it is impossible to please God, and to come unto the fellowship of His sons: but we are therefore said to be justified freely, because that none of those things which precede justification-whether faith or works-merit the grace itself of justification. For, if it be a grace, it is not now by works, otherwise, as the same Apostle says, grace is no more grace. (Council of Trent, 6th Session, ch. viii)

For, although no one can be just, but he to whom the merits of the Passion of our Lord Jesus Christ are communicated, yet is this done in the said justification of the impious, when by the merit of that same most holy Passion, the charity of God is poured forth, by the Holy Spirit, in the hearts of those that are justified, and is inherent therein: whence, man, through Jesus Christ, in whom he is ingrafted, receives, in the said justification, together with the remission of sins, all these (gifts) infused at once, faith, hope, and charity. For faith, unless hope and charity be added thereto, neither unites man perfectly with Christ, nor makes him a living member of His body. For which reason it is most truly said, that Faith without works is dead and profitless; and, In Christ Jesus neither circumcision, availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but faith which worketh by charity. (Council of Trent, 6th Session, ch. vii)

If any one saith, that man may be justified before God by his own works, whether done through the teaching of human nature, or that of the law, without the grace of God through Jesus Christ; let him be anathema. (Council of Trent, 6th Session, Canon I)

If any one saith, that the grace of God, through Jesus Christ, is given only for this, that man may be able more easily to live justly, and to merit eternal life, as if, by free will without grace, he were able to do both, though hardly indeed and with difficulty; let him be anathema. (Council of Trent, 6th Session, Canon II)

If any one saith, that without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Ghost, and without his help, man can believe, hope, love, or be penitent as he ought, so as that the grace of Justification may be bestowed upon him; let him be anathema. (Council of Trent, 6th Session, Canon III)

Of the satisfactory works of penance the Council of Trent makes this explicit declaration: “Thus, man has not wherein to glory, but all our glorying is in Christ, in whom we live, move, and make satisfaction, bringing forth fruits worthy of penance, which from Him have their efficacy, are by Him offered to the Father, and through Him find with the Father acceptance” (Council of Trent, 14th Session, ch. viii)

(‘JD’ stands for the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification, signed by the Catholic church and a large number of Lutheran denominations.)

Dolly the organ machine

The recent scientific achievement of producing a sheep containing about 85% sheep cells and about 15% human cells has, of course, triggered the next round in Christian thought on the subject of ‘playing God’ versus progress. One writer at the Catholic, liberty-friendly Acton Institute blog has written several posts mostly disapproving of the idea of chimeras. His most recent musing critiques the presentation of the breakthrough by the media, and he argues that calling something 15% human is disingenuous, since ‘being human’ is a kind of on-off switch. (I agree with him on this, of course, but he seems to be presenting this criticism as though it’s a part of a larger case against chimeras, which I don’t follow). The author links to his past posts criticizing chimeras, which I’ll have to go through more thoroughly, and he further quotes from the article that ’silent viruses’ are a big concern with the future of animal ogran-growers:

According to reports, Dr Patrick Dixon, an international lecturer on biological trends, warned: “Many silent viruses could create a biological nightmare in humans. Mutant animal viruses are a real threat, as we have seen with HIV.”

Now, I don’t find the critiques of chimera technology that stem from its potentially negative consequences to be compelling. If it is true that human organs harvested from sheep could contain silent viruses, then it follows that scientists (and in addition — or, at least, in a better world — private firms and corporations) will have to be very careful and deliberative in making the technology accessible. This is a narrow critique, however, and only accidentally applies to chimeras in general. Certainly Christians shouldn’t base any substantial objection to chimeras based on silent viruses (or other accidental concerns), because the technology to deal with these problems isn’t far behind the human-organs-in-animals technology itself. The shelf-life on the argument is a good tip that it’s probably not a good one to use in the first place.

The better Christian critique of this genre of science has to do with the following (roughly put, inadequately categorized) concern: What is it that humans, given their nature, ought and ought not to do with creation, given its nature? Nevertheless, I’d bet that there will be more critiques of Dolly the organ sheep based on some abstract claim that science has finally gone too far and is playing God in an inappropriate way.

In my view, any critique claiming that the creation and use of chimeras ‘goes too far’ or is ‘playing God’ with human DNA and animals will have to be firmly rooted in a clear understanding of human nature (and the nature of animals). It is clear that God has given humans stewardship over the use of this world, which I would argue includes (among other concerns) transforming things around us in ways that are beneficial to our life and health. Thus, it seems to me that good stewardship and respect for human nature doesn’t preclude the use of medicines to cure sickness, advanced farming techniques, or air conditioning, for example.

(Additionally, I don’t buy the arguments against birth control that base themselves on an appeal to letting God plan one’s family rather than taking this natural process into our own hands. If I were to take a stand against birth control it would be for the reasons embraced by the Catholic church — namely, that if the proper object of sex is procreation, then it is unethical to strip the activity of its proper end and enjoy the means as an end in themselves, apart from the greater end of reproduction. It’d be the equivalent of chewing up food and simply spitting it out. Since I’m not convinced that procreation is the only proper end of sexual relations, I don’t buy this argument either . . . although I have to admit that I probably would were I Catholic. But enough of this, for now.)

It goes beyond the tinkering with humanity, too. I don’t feel metaphysically threatened by the possibility of creating artificial intelligence, for example — heck, robots doing the grunt work of daily labor for us would be fantastic! Likewise, I don’t see much ethical harm in manipulating the genes of crops to be more productive, disease resistant, etc. As Christians have faced these changes historically, it seems to me that many of the ‘lines drawn in the sand’ have been somewhat arbitrary. However well-intentioned the critiques may be, they generally have sounded to me more like reactions to something new than a principled stance against progress based on a given understanding of human nature.

What might a principled argument against chimeras look like? Well, I suspect that the Acton blog contributor Jordan Ballor is on to something here and here, but I am, of course, not well read enough to engage this debate for now.

I wonder if Mr. Ballor would object to organ-growing technology if it were possible to, say, grow them using animal cells but without using an animal host. It seems to me that, were the technology there, housing a hallway full of kidneys would be far more efficient than taking care of an animal organ-host, which would need far more space — not to mention food, attention, etc. Suppose we take the living animal out of the equation, but keep the gene and cell manipulation — what then?

Thomas dances. . .

  My apologies, because I will probably be posting substantial portions of Tommy ‘Nas in the next few days (weeks? months?) as I start making cursory glances through his works in English, found here and described here in my blog post.

In today’s story, St. Thomas will take on the age old question of free will versus Divine sovereignty.  Does God’s foreknowledge and pre-ordination necessitate specific actions on the part of humans?

***

” . . .[W]e come to the question whether, because of divine ordination or predestination, human acts become necessary. This question requires caution so as to defend the truth and avoid falsity or error.

“It is erroneous to say that human acts and events escape God’s fore-knowledge and ordination. It is no less erroneous to say that God’s fore-knowledge and ordination imposes necessity on human acts; otherwise free will would be removed, as well as the value of taking counsel, the usefulness of laws, the care to do what is right and the justice of rewards and punishments.

“We must observe that God knows things differently from man. Man is subject to time and therefore knows things temporally, seeing some things as present, recalling others as past, and fore-seeing others as future. But God is above the passage of time, and his existence is eternal. So his knowledge is not temporal, but eternal. Eternity is compared to time as something indivisible to what is continuous. Thus in time there is a difference of successive parts according to before and after, but eternity has no before and after, because eternal things are free from any change.

“Thus eternity is totally at once, just as a point lacks parts that are distinct in location. For a point can be compared to a line in two ways: first as included in the line, whether at the beginning, middle or end, secondly as existing outside a line. A point within a line cannot be present to all the parts of the line, but in different parts of the line different points must be designated. But a point outside the line can view all parts of the line equally, as in a circle, whose central point is indivisible and faces all the parts of the circumference and all of them are somehow present to it, although not to one another.

“An instant, which is a limit of time, is comparable to the point included in a line. It is not present to all parts of time, but in different parts of time different instances are designated. Eternity is something like the point outside a line, like the centre of a circle. Since it is simple and indivisible, it comprehends the whole passage of time and each part of time is equally present to it, although one part of time follows another.

“Thus God, who looks at everything from the high point of eternity, views as present the whole passage of time and everything that is done in time. Therefore, when I see Socrates sitting, my knowledge is infallible and certain, but no necessity is imposed on Socrates to be seated. Thus God, seeing everything that is past, future or present to us as present to himself, knows all this infallibly and certainly, yet without imposing on contingent things any necessity of existing.

“This comparison can be accepted, if we compare the passage of time to travel over a road. If someone is on a road over which many people pass, he sees those who are just ahead of him, but cannot certainly know those who come after him. But if someone stands in a high place where he can see the whole road, he sees at once all who are moving on the road. Thus man, who is in time, cannot see the whole course of time at once, but only thinks that just in front of him, namely the present, and a few things of the past, but he cannot know future things for certain. But God, from the high point of his eternity sees with certitude and as present all that is done through the whole course of time, without imposing necessity on contingent things.

“Just as God’s knowledge does not impose necessity on contingent things, neither does his ordination, by which he providentially orders the universe. For he orders things the way he acts on things; his ordination does not violate but brings to effect by his power what he planned in his Wisdom.

“As for the action of God’s power, we should observe that he acts in everything and moves each single thing to its actions according to the manner proper to each thing, so that some things, by divine motion, act from necessity, as the motion of heavenly bodies [according to ancient cosmology], while others contingently, which sometimes fail in their proper action because of their corruptibility. A tree, for example, sometimes is impeded from producing fruit and an animal from generating offspring. Thus Divine Wisdom orders things so that they happen after the manner of their proper causes. In the case of man, it is natural for him to act freely, not forced, because rational powers can turn in opposite directions. Thus God orders human actions in a way that these actions are not subject to necessity, but come from free will.”

***
That’s about as good and concise a formulation of the ‘classical answer’ (first proposed by Boethius, unless I’m mistaken) that I have seen.  It comes from a short tract authored by Aquinas entitled: Reasons for the Faith Against Muslim Objections.  It isn’t too hard, I don’t think, to show that God (if eternal) can know things without necessitating them.  Yet what is particularly good here, in my opinion, is Aquinas’ elucidation (in the last two paragraphs) of how human choice does not negate pre-ordination, that is, the special action of ordering on God’s part.

Aquinas also has a blistering couple of paragraphs that evangelical Christians of the last century should have read before putting so much thought toward ‘proving’ God’s truth to skeptics in any meaningful sense.

Chapter 2: How to argue with unbelievers

First of all I wish to warn you that in disputations with unbelievers about articles of the Faith, you should not try to prove the Faith by necessary reasons. This would belittle the sublimity of the Faith, whose truth exceeds not only human minds but also those of angels; we believe in them only because they are revealed by God.

Yet whatever comes from the Supreme Truth cannot be false, and what is not false cannot be repudiated by any necessary reason. Just as our Faith cannot be proved by necessary reasons, because it exceeds the human mind, so because of its truth it cannot be refuted by any necessary reason. So any Christian disputing about the articles of the Faith should not try to prove the Faith, but defend the Faith. Thus blessed Peter (1 Pet 3:15) did not say: “Always have your proof”, but “your answer ready,” so that reason can show that what the Catholic Faith holds is not false.

God’s warning. . .

. . .against the State.

“These will be the rights of the king who is to reign over you. He will take your sons and assign them to his chariotry and cavalry, and they will run in front of his chariot. He will use them as leaders of a thousand and leaders of fifty; he will make them plough his ploughland and harvest his harvest and make his weapons of war and the gear for his chariots. He will also take your daughters as perfumers, cooks, and bakers. He will take the best of your fields, of your vineyards and olive groves and give them to his officials. He will tithe your crops and vineyards to provide for his eunuchs and his officials. He will take the best of your manservants and maidservants, of your cattle and your donkeys, and make them work for him. He will tithe your flocks, and you yourselves will become his slaves. When that day comes, you will cry out on account of the king you have chosen for yourselves, but on that day God will not answer you.”

(1 Sam. 8:11–18)

We have a few thousand kings in Washington, but the principles are the same. Are we really to believe that God was going to rule Israel personally, and with an iron fist, or did He originally plan for the Hebrew society to organize itself around His law?

Merit, grace, and reward

Is there any sense in which we can say that we (ever) merit (anything whatsoever) from God?

The quick reformed answer is “No, never, not in any circumstance.” But I think that the context of this reply is, in general, a concern that if we can merit anything whatsoever, it appears as though some grace was earnable from God, insofar as we acted (apart from? in spite of?) Him and thereby put Him in our debt. Hence, the definition of grace is negated, and we are left to wonder why it is that we believe a human did anything apart from grace.

I’ve been pondering this passage in the Summa Theologiae, trying to weigh these thoughts in my head and come to some semblance of clarity:

***

Whether a man may merit anything from God?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man can merit nothing from God. For no one, it would seem, merits by giving another his due. But by all the good we do, we cannot make sufficient return to God, since yet more is His due, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14). Hence it is written (Lk. 17:10): “When you have done all these things that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which we ought to do.” Therefore a man can merit nothing from God.

Objection 2: Further, it would seem that a man merits nothing from God, by what profits himself only, and profits God nothing. Now by acting well, a man profits himself or another man, but not God, for it is written (Job 35:7): “If thou do justly, what shalt thou give Him, or what shall He receive of thy hand.” Hence a man can merit nothing from God.

Objection 3: Further, whoever merits anything from another makes him his debtor; for a man’s wage is a debt due to him. Now God is no one’s debtor; hence it is written (Rm. 11:35): “Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made to him?” Hence no one can merit anything from God.

On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 31:16): “There is a reward for thy work.” Now a reward means something bestowed by reason of merit. Hence it would seem that a man may merit from God.

I answer that, Merit and reward refer to the same, for a reward means something given anyone in return for work or toil, as a price for it. Hence, as it is an act of justice to give a just price for anything received from another, so also is it an act of justice to make a return for work or toil. Now justice is a kind of equality, as is clear from the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 3), and hence justice is simply between those that are simply equal; but where there is no absolute equality between them, neither is there absolute justice, but there may be a certain manner of justice, as when we speak of a father’s or a master’s right (Ethic. v, 6), as the Philosopher says. And hence where there is justice simply, there is the character of merit and reward simply. But where there is no simple right, but only relative, there is no character of merit simply, but only relatively, in so far as the character of justice is found there, since the child merits something from his father and the slave from his lord.

Now it is clear that between God and man there is the greatest inequality: for they are infinitely apart, and all man’s good is from God. Hence there can be no justice of absolute equality between man and God, but only of a certain proportion, inasmuch as both operate after their own manner. Now the manner and measure of human virtue is in man from God. Hence man’s merit with God only exists on the presupposition of the Divine ordination, so that man obtains from God, as a reward of his operation, what God gave him the power of operation for, even as natural things by their proper movements and operations obtain that to which they were ordained by God; differently, indeed, since the rational creature moves itself to act by its free-will, hence its action has the character of merit, which is not so in other creatures.

Reply to Objection 1: Man merits, inasmuch as he does what he ought, by his free-will; otherwise the act of justice whereby anyone discharges a debt would not be meritorious.

Reply to Objection 2: God seeks from our goods not profit, but glory, i.e. the manifestation of His goodness; even as He seeks it also in His own works. Now nothing accrues to Him, but only to ourselves, by our worship of Him. Hence we merit from God, not that by our works anything accrues to Him, but inasmuch as we work for His glory.

Reply to Objection 3: Since our action has the character of merit, only on the presupposition of the Divine ordination, it does not follow that God is made our debtor simply, but His own, inasmuch as it is right that His will should be carried out.

***

All merit is understood with the presupposition that God pre-ordains certain rewards for certain actions. Aquinas thinks that this pre-ordination doesn’t negate the idea that we yet might merit reward from God, as a reformed protestant might. (E.g. ‘If God pre-ordains it you cannot be said to have merited it.’) I can’t figure out in this context if he’s referring specifically to salvation, to merit in general, or to rewards that would presumably be given based on post-regeneration merit.

That last category — actions post-regeneration — really interests me when thinking about grace, reward, and merit. I guess one way I could pose my initial question, stripped of the ’salvation puzzle’, would be to say: “Can the regenerated saints merit anything whatsoever from God?”

Can I, as a regenerated human, have any discernible part of righteous action that is rewarded in accordance with what God has decreed?

If not, then all righteous acts — even after regeneration — must be God supernaturally imposing righteousness on me. I don’t like this option very much, and I don’t think that it aligns with scripture.

Or, alternatively, I can do righteous action but there are no decreed rewards that this merits — i.e. my life of practicing righteousness is merely the returned thanks for my salvation. I can understand this option (see the scripture passage quoted in Objection 1), but I wonder whether it is scriptural.

–

Some additional thoughts after having a conversation with a friend last night. Here are some (roughly stated, badly put, etc.) options for how one might view merit:

(1) Regenerated humans cannot perform righteous action. Everything that humans do is sinful in some sense. All perceived righteous action is some intervention by the Holy Spirit. Therefore, all merit is due to Christ in every sense. (I don’t think it’s too hard to reject this.)

(2) Christians can and do perform “good” actions in a qualified sense. Of course, there will always be the taint of sin on any given action, due to our old nature, with which we must wrestle until our death, resurrection, and glorification. However, since Christ’s sacrifice has covered all sins, even the ‘tainted’ good actions will be seen as good actions based on their incorporation into Christ’s merit. God will see the good in our actions as good, and will not see the bad due to Christ’s mediation. Humans, therefore, receive some degree of “merit” from God, decreed rewards for certain actions, although only Christ’s intervention makes even this possible.

(3) Christians, having a new nature, can perform good actions that merit rewards based on God’s decrees and pre-ordination.

I lean toward option (3), if only because (2) seems to cut out options that scripture seems to uphold. I have no doubt that I have performed very few truly good actions — if any! — in my life. Sin and my sin nature permeate my habits, thoughts, and actions. Nevertheless, to uphold option (2) is to claim that no regenerate Christian may ever perform an action that has no aspect of sin to it.

I really haven’t found Scripture that compels me toward upholding (2). Scripture is very clear that our actions don’t merit a righteous standing before God, but I would want to see some kind of support for believing that no regenerate Christian may do good things, especially since we are commanded to do so.

The Bible clearly says that no person may keep the law to his or her own righteousness, but where does it say that our actions while on this earth cannot merit pre-ordained reward, or that any and all actions of regenerate humans are tainted with sin? I think that’s the ‘missing link’ in scriptural support that I’m looking for.

Hmm.