Every so often the economy experiences a boom period followed by a bust period; every 1920’s has its 30’s; every 1990’s has its . . . well, early 2000’s, although there may be darker days ahead.
The Austrian business cycle theory points out that this nation-wide period of ‘over-investment’ followed by its doomsday — recessions and depressions — is not primarily a function of entrepreneurs who are either evil or somehow uniformly deceived across the nation in a free market. Instead, the ABCT points to a far more obvious explanation for cycles: the way in which the Federal Reserve controls the money supply.
Money in its primitive form was simply a convenient way for chicken farmers needing shoes to forgo finding a cobbler badly in need of eggs. Having a medium between these exchanges — that is, using indirect exchange — seems inefficient on its surface, but it turns out to be an incredibly effective way to get from eggs to shoes and also from eggs to legal services. Without trading for gold first, the farmer depends on shoe-makers who need eggs, or likewise lawyers that need them. But when a commodity, historically gold and silver for many fascinating reasons, arises as a good in high demand everywhere, the farmer need not worry about the “market” of eggs for legal services or eggs for shoes.
Thus, it is clear that money had its value not simply as an arbitrary token, but that a given society would have already recognized the value of gold or silver, and therefore prices for any given good could be expressed in terms of the metal. Its use as money came from its pre-existing value and its convenience for the purposes of exchange; it was not due to gold’s use as money that it became valuable.
It is easy to see, then, why paper fiat currencies are inherently unstable. The value of a dollar is necessarily predicated on its use as a medium of exchange — and not the other way around. A central bank that has been given the task of regulating fiat currencies finds itself in a crisis of calculation. How much money should there be on the market at any given time? Should the money supply increase, and if so, at what rate? Should the money supply ever decrease? In what way should “new” money be pumped into circulation — to whom do we give the money that we have created out of thin air? Since the banks “make up” how much money exists, they are prone (and bound) to make lots of damaging mistakes. You can’t fudge up how much gold is in the warehouse, unless you lie. But how can you hold someone accountable when they can simply create something from nothing?
Since the functioning of a central bank are necessarily political — that is, not based on pleasing consumers through voluntary exchange but rather backed by simple government edict — its decisions will not direct resources to their most urgent needs. Practically, this works out in many ways. For example, recipients of “new” money fresh off the press have historically been those closest to the central bank — the financial district in New York — and the government. Since the government has no need of money other than to spend it, it immediately goes to those with the best political connections: in most cases, government contractors. The poor and those on fixed incomes (retired people, pastors, those working the lowest jobs, etc.) are hurt the most.
Subprime mortgages, a recent bubble-burst that will undoubtedly be evaluated ad nauseum for the next decade, are a great example of how central planning causes credit and finances to go awry. The Federal Reserve has been pumping money into housing as a part of the government’s efforts to boost production and growth that particular industry. Many people bought, expanded, or built homes who otherwise wouldn’t have, and they were financed by banks who were getting cheap credit from the central bank. For a while, the trend was toward loaning and spending, investment, and growth. But as the Federal Reserve has reset interest rates higher than before, it makes it difficult for those most in debt to keep up with interest rates and their payments. Whatever the cause, it is clear that the poor have been given false messages of easy money, en masse, and are now facing a bill that they can’t afford.
Two authors, with completely different perspectives, analyze the problem as follows:
Benjamin Barber, professor at the University of Maryland, full article here:
Highlights:
“The crisis in subprime mortgages betrays a deeper predicament facing consumer capitalism triumphant: The “Protestant ethos” of hard work and deferred gratification has been replaced by an infantilist ethos of easy credit and impulsive consumption that puts democracy and the market system at risk.
“Capitalism’s success, however, has meant that core wants in the developed world are now mostly met and that too many goods are chasing too few needs. Yet capitalism requires us to “need” all that it produces in order to survive. So it busies itself manufacturing needs for the wealthy while ignoring the wants of the truly needy.
“When we see politics permeate every sector of life, we call it totalitarianism. When religion rules all, we call it theocracy. But when commerce dominates everything, we call it liberty. Can we redirect capitalism to its proper end: the satisfaction of real human needs? Well, why not?
“To do this, we will require the assistance of democratic institutions and an adult ethos. Public citizens must be restored to their proper place as masters of their private choices. To sustain itself, capitalism once again will have to respond to real needs instead of trying to fabricate synthetic ones — or risk consuming itself. “
My response to this is that Prof. Barber makes a quick jump from subprime mortgage rates to a canned critique of capitalism. His tactic is the “this is but one more sign of X,” without ever showing how the this applies to X.
Mr. Barber quickly jumps on consumers, and rich consumers in particular, but it’s difficult to see how he got there. After all, what group of people has been over-consuming in the case of failing subprime mortgages? The answer is people who are generally not able to secure loans, unless the money is particularly easy to get ahold of. The poor. So why is capitalism at fault for these poor people trying to secure housing for themselves? I don’t know. There’s a possible answer here, but Barber quickly shifts away from this to his ‘core concerns’ with capitalism, and we never seem to get back to subprime loans. The answer, in other words, is: “Capitalism is at fault in this case. Don’t ask me why I think so in this case, but I can show you why I don’t like capitalism in general.”
While Mr. Barber’s critique of capitalism qua critique of capitalism might have some merit on its own (I don’t think that it does), nothing that he said really applies to subprime mortgage rates.
Analysis on Mises.org goes more directly to the heart of the matter, in my opinion (full article here):
Highlights:
“However, barring such an unexpected positive shock, it seems increasingly clear that we will see a US recession this year. The main reason for this is that the housing bubble that fueled the recovery of the last few years has essentially burst.
“So far, the economy has seemingly handled this fairly well and experienced what one might call a “soft landing,” with growth being slow but still well above zero. Yet there are increasing signs that the worst is yet to come. Much of the housing bubble was financed by so-called subprime mortgages, mortgages to people with a low credit rating. Subprime mortgages were encouraged greatly by the government, with the Federal Reserve providing a cheap source of credit and with Bush encouraging it as part of the “ownership society” that he envisioned. But after the Fed was forced to raise interest rates again, and as the introductory teaser offers expired, the cost of borrowing for the subprime borrowers increased sharply. And as subprime lenders almost by definition have weak personal finances, many have proven unable to handle that.”
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The constant in both of these opinion / analysis pieces is credit. Too much credit fosters over-consumption beyond realistic means. The problem of over-consumption can only be ignored for so long before reality must be dealt with. Barber sees the main problem as a vague cultural value that “we” need to fix through politics; Karlson looks to the source of the credit and asks why the system has been set up this way.
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I’ll close by drawing this analogy. Suppose that I’m in charge of a restaurant that provides dinner for 50 people every night, and that I have the legal rights to a monopoly on salad production. I discover that I can make a great-looking salad substitute with grass from the field behind our building. Lettuce costs money, but the grass is an abundant resource (and free!), so how much grass I stick into the salads is limited only by my own discretion. I am able to charge less for my salads the more grass I sneak in, and as time passes more people come to eat my cheap (and seemingly delicious) salad, since it’s so cheap here and they can’t get it anywhere else.
After a time, as always, reality kicks in, and it becomes readily apparent that people are getting quite sick after eating my salad. Word gets out that I’m committing fraud, that my salad was really grass, and that I “created” fake salad out of nothing in order to satisfy consumer demand without paying for more lettuce.
If you’re Professor Barber, the natural response would be: “Obviously capitalism has oversold itself on consuming. Producers created so much stuff that people had to believe that grass was good for them in order to fulfill wants that weren’t actually needs. We need to rethink our system of salad distribution so as to better meet the needs of the poor.” The implication, of course, is that the salad-producer needs more funds, or perhaps a change of personnel (which, unfortunately, doesn’t happen in the Federal Reserve).
If you’re Stefan Karlsson, the natural response is: “Let’s hold the salad-counterfeiter accountable. Fraud is no laughing matter.” The implication, of course, is that it was a bad idea to put one guy in charge of the salad, next to a field of grass and with immunity from punishment, in the first place.